Dr Manuel Vogel
Kreston Global Indirect Tax Business Development Director and CEO, Kreston A&O, Switzerland
The Swiss Transparency Register
November 17, 2026
Since 01.10.2026, the Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Entities and the Identification of Beneficial Owners (TJPG) and its implementing Ordinance (TJPV) have been in force.1 For the first time, Switzerland thus has a central, officially supervised register of beneficial owners. This article provides an overview of the scope, the concept of control, reporting content and deadlines, the simplified procedure, and supervision and sanctions; it distinguishes the new rules from anti-money laundering law and the EU framework, examines the implications for M&A and investor agreements and concludes with practical recommendations. Dr. Manuel Vogel of a&o kreston, a Kreston Global member firm in Switzerland, discusses the changes and what they mean in practice.
Key points
- Reporting obligations apply in particular to companies limited by shares (AG), partnerships limited by shares, limited liability companies (GmbH) and cooperatives, as well as foreign legal entities with a qualifying Swiss nexus; associations and foundations are not covered.
- A beneficial owner is anyone who holds at least 25% of the capital or votes – reaching the threshold is sufficient – or who controls the company by other means. All forms of control must be assessed in parallel; there is no cascade as under anti-money laundering law.
- Even persons holding few or no shares may be reportable through board appointment, veto or distribution rights; such controlling persons must notify the company themselves.
- Anyone holding through a nominee always exercises indirect control. Nominee arrangements are not apparent from the share register or the commercial register and must be actively enquired about.
- The extent of control is reported in bands only (25–50%, >50–75%, >75%); changes within a band need not be reported.
- The duty to identify has applied since 01.10.2026. The initial report is due between January and April 2027 depending on legal form and audit requirement, or by 01.10.2028 where all beneficial owners are entered in the commercial register – but within one month of any earlier change to the commercial register entry.
- In transactions, closing is generally decisive; veto rights, board appointment rights and earn-outs may give rise to reportable control.
- The register is not public; intentional violations are punishable by fines of up to CHF 500’000.
Background and legislative process
Since 2015, shareholders and GmbH members have been required to notify the company of their beneficial owners (Art. 697j et seq. and Art. 790a CO).2 However, there was no central database to which authorities could gain rapid access. The FATF repeatedly criticised this gap in its 2016 mutual evaluation and follow-up reports.3 The Federal Council adopted the Dispatch on the TJPG on 22.05.2024;4 Parliament passed the bill on 26.09.2025 and the referendum period expired unused on 15.01.2026. The consultation on the TJPV ran from 15.10.2025 to 30.01.2026.5 On 12.06.2026 the Federal Council adopted the TJPV and brought the TJPG and TJPV into force on 01.10.2026, together with the revised Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA).6 Beforehand, a pilot project involving around 2’500 companies tested the infrastructure and processes.7
The key change concerns who carries out the identification: previously, companies merely kept an internal register based on notifications from their shareholders, while the actual identification of beneficial owners under the AMLA was the responsibility of financial intermediaries. Legal entities must now determine for themselves who controls them. Since authorities, financial intermediaries and advisers have access, incomplete or inconsistent information will quickly come to light. The timetable is deliberately tight: the next FATF mutual evaluation is scheduled for 2027, and as much information as possible is to be in the register by then.8
Scope of application
The Act covers companies under Swiss law in the form of an AG, partnership limited by shares, GmbH or cooperative, as well as the collective investment schemes SICAV, SICAF and limited partnership for collective investment (LPCI). Foreign legal entities are subject to the Act if they have a branch entered in the commercial register, are effectively managed in Switzerland or own real estate in Switzerland.9
Exempt are listed companies and their subsidiaries held more than 75%, supervised pension funds and companies at least 75% owned by public bodies.10 Associations and foundations do not fall under the TJPG. For trustees domiciled or resident in Switzerland who are not subject to the AMLA, the Act provides for separate identification and record-keeping obligations.11
Definition of beneficial owner
A beneficial owner is always a natural person who ultimately controls the company, whether through a holding of at least 25% of the capital or votes – alone or acting in concert – or by other means.12 The TJPV specifies this concept in four categories: direct holding (Art. 1), indirect holding (Art. 2), control by other means (Art. 3) and acting in concert (Art. 4).
Direct holding (Art. 1 TJPV)
A holding is direct if capital or voting rights are not held through interposed natural persons, legal entities or trusts; only a person holding in their own name and for their own account is thus a direct holder. The provision was only added after the consultation. It is declaratory and serves as an interpretative guide, since Art. 6 TJPG only empowers the Federal Council to specify indirect control and control by other means; its main purpose is to distinguish direct from indirect holdings.13 In practice, three pitfalls arise:
- Nominee arrangements: Anyone holding through a nominee always exercises indirect control; the beneficial owner is the principal. The type of control “holding (indirect)”, the extent, the role as principal and the chain of control including the nominee must be reported – regardless of the number of intermediate levels.14 Since the share register, the register of quotas and the commercial register only show the formal holder, the company must actively enquire, request supporting documents and record the answers. The same applies to usufruct, which shifts the voting right to the usufructuary.15
- Threshold: Capital and voting rights are alternative criteria; the threshold is already met at exactly 25%. A person who, thanks to voting shares, holds half of the votes with 10% of the capital is a beneficial owner.16 For an AG, the capital ratio is based on the sum of share capital and participation capital; profit-sharing certificates and conversion and option rights are disregarded, but may become relevant as a means of control by other means.17
- Time of acquisition: The transfer of title is decisive and, for registered shares with transfer restrictions, also the company’s approval; entry in the share register is in principle merely declaratory.18
Indirect holding (Art. 2 TJPV)
Indirect control requires a holding of more than 50% at each intermediate level; compared with the consultation draft (“at least 50%”), the threshold was raised to align with anti-money laundering practice. The holdings at the individual levels are not multiplied.19
Control by other means (Art. 3 TJPV)
Control by other means is the second pillar of the concept of control. It captures persons who hold no relevant stake but exercise comparable control – typically in family companies with pooling agreements, in private equity and investor structures, and in nominee arrangements and among related parties.20 The Ordinance distinguishes two levels. Under Art. 3(1) TJPV, three constellations always constitute control, without any separate assessment of the intensity of influence; the objection that the right is never exercised or merely protects the investment is excluded:
- Board majority: the right or actual ability to appoint or remove more than half of the members of the board of directors or management body; individual nomination rights are not sufficient. This covers, for example, an entrepreneur who has transferred all shares to his children as part of a succession plan but continues to determine the majority of the board through a shareholders’ agreement.
- Veto rights in the exhaustive list: change of corporate purpose, appointment of management, change and extension of corporate strategy, budgets and investment planning, and equity and debt financing. A single item is sufficient (see section 10).
- Profit distributions and asset disposals: the person can legally or actually determine such decisions, even without being a member of the decision-making body. A mere right to propose or to convene a meeting is not sufficient; however, hidden outflows of funds outside the dividend, such as management fees, are also covered.
Art. 3(2) TJPV then lists the means through which control may be exercised: shareholders’ agreements, capital instruments such as convertible bonds or profit-participating loans, provisions of the articles of association, agency and nominee relationships, and relationships between related parties. Their mere existence is not sufficient; they only constitute control if they confer influence equivalent to a 25% holding. The overall picture is decisive – several rights that are weak on their own may together amount to a controlling position. A founder who has formally left the board but continues to take all strategic decisions must therefore be reported. Conversely, mere proximity is not sufficient: the spouse of the sole shareholder or an adult child without a stake is not a beneficial owner for that reason alone.21 In the case of control by other means, the “extent” field in the register remains empty; it is replaced by a description of how control is actually exercised.
Acting in concert and parallel assessment
Where several persons act in concert, the jointly held stake is decisive for the threshold. If, for example, three siblings each hold 15% and have undertaken to vote according to the instructions of the eldest, all three must be reported with a joint extent of 45%; a community of heirs is another typical case.22
Unlike under Art. 2a(3) AMLA, where control by other means is only examined if nobody holds 25%, all categories must be assessed in parallel under the TJPG and all results reported. The Federal Council justifies this by noting that the company – unlike a bank – knows at all times by whom and how the relevant decisions are taken. Identifying a major shareholder therefore does not end the assessment: if one shareholder holds 30% and an investor 10% with a veto over strategic decisions and the right to nominate the majority of the board, both must be reported.23 Only the most senior member of the managing body remains subordinate: this person is deemed the beneficial owner on a subsidiary basis if nobody reaches the threshold and nobody controls by other means – depending on the organisation, the CEO or the chairman of the board.24 This must be distinguished from the case where a beneficial owner exists but cannot be identified or verified: in that case, the available information and the most senior member of the managing body must be reported as contact person.25
Reporting content, deadlines and procedure
The company must identify the beneficial owner: name, date of birth, nationalities and residence; in addition, the Swiss social security (AHV) number must be established or – if none exists – a copy of an identity document obtained.26 The type of control must be stated (alone or in concert, direct or indirect, through a holding or by other means).27 The extent need only be reported within one of three bands: at least 25% up to 50%, more than 50% up to 75%, or more than 75%. Changes in holdings therefore only need to be reported if a band is crossed.
This relief does not apply to control by other means: here, every change in the basis of control must be reported, such as a new or terminated shareholders’ agreement, an amended veto list or the end of a nominee arrangement. By contrast, certain changes of nationality, name or company name already reported to other authorities do not need to be reported.28
Enquiries, answers, supporting documents and the company’s own assessment must be documented and retained for ten years after the person ceases to be a beneficial owner.29 Reporting is electronic via EasyGov.swiss, where the company must first register, and is free of charge; in certain cases it is made via an interface with the cantonal commercial register office.30 The most senior member of the managing body is responsible; delegation is permitted but does not release this person from responsibility.31
| Situation | Deadline |
| New incorporation or newly covered entity | One month after registration or becoming subject to the Act |
| Change in beneficial owners | One month from knowledge |
| Existing company with a register change before the transitional period ends | One month after the change (Art. 51(1) TJPG) |
| Existing company, all BOs registered as members or officers in the commercial register | Two years, i.e. until 01.10.2028 (Art. 51(2) TJPG) |
| AG with full (ordinary) audit | Three months: January 2027 (Art. 51(3) TJPG) |
| Other companies with full audit | Four months: February 2027 |
| AG without full audit | Five months: March 2027 |
| Other legal entities; entities under foreign law | Six months: April 2027 (Art. 51(3), Art. 53 TJPG) |
| Acquisition of a controlling stake | Holder notifies the company within one month (Art. 13 TJPG) |
Practical note: For entities under Swiss law, all transitional periods are maximum periods. The very first change to the commercial register entry after 01.10.2026 – such as board elections at the next general meeting or an amendment of the articles – shortens the deadline to one month unless the ordinary deadline expires earlier; this also applies to companies benefiting from the two-year period. The latter rarely helps where there is control by other means, since such controlling persons are hardly ever entered in the commercial register. Moreover, only reporting is deferred, not identification: the duty to identify has applied since 01.10.2026.32
Simplified procedure
For simple structures, the Ordinance provides a simplified reporting procedure via the cantonal commercial register office, in particular for GmbHs whose members are exclusively natural persons exercising control through capital, and for single-shareholder AGs whose sole shareholder is also the sole board member. The company confirms that there are no further beneficial owners.33 The two-year transitional period applies to these companies unless a change to the commercial register entry occurs earlier.
Duties of holders to cooperate
Holders acquiring a controlling stake must notify the company of the beneficial owner within one month of control arising and provide the necessary information and supporting documents on request.34 Beneficial owners themselves have a duty to cooperate along the chain of control.35 Anyone controlling the company by other means must notify the company directly within one month, as there is no intermediate holder. This duty is independent, subject to penalties and cannot be shifted to the company – investors, pool members and family shareholders must therefore take action themselves.36 An express cooperation clause is recommended in shareholders’ agreements and purchase agreements.
Access, supervision and sanctions
The register is kept by the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) and is not public. Online access is available to the Control Office and certain authorities, in particular federal and cantonal police, administrative and criminal authorities, the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) and the authorities responsible for administrative assistance in tax matters. Financial intermediaries and advisers subject to the AMLA have access to fulfil their due diligence obligations, which continue to apply unchanged under Art. 4, 8b and 8c AMLA.37 All queries are logged.38 The entry is not constitutive; Parliament expressly rejected a presumption of accuracy within the meaning of Art. 9(1) of the Civil Code.39 Financial intermediaries who identify relevant discrepancies with their own findings must report them within 30 days.40 A Control Office within the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) reviews entries on a risk basis and by random sampling and may order measures. Each company is assigned to a risk category. If it fails to respond to a reminder or cannot identify the beneficial owner, the registry authority adds a note to the entry signalling doubts as to its accuracy, which automatically results in at least the “medium risk” category.41
| Offence | Consequence |
| Intentional breach of the duty to report or provide information, false statements (Art. 43 TJPG) | Fine of up to CHF 500’000 |
| Failure to comply with a final ruling (Art. 44 TJPG) | Fine of up to CHF 100’000 |
| Repeated breaches by a holder (Art. 38(2) TJPG) | Suspension of membership and financial rights |
| Manifestly inactive company (Art. 38(3) TJPG) | Order of dissolution and liquidation |
Negligent violations are not punishable. Fines are generally imposed on the natural persons acting, not on the company. Prosecution and adjudication lie with the FDF under administrative criminal law; the limitation period for prosecution is seven years.42
Amendments to the Code of Obligations
The TJPG repeals the previous notification duties to the company (Art. 697j–697m and Art. 790a CO). The share register must now be kept for ten years and be accessible in Switzerland (Art. 747 CO). Registers of beneficial owners kept under the previous law must be retained for a further ten years from entry into force.43
Distinction from anti-money laundering law and EU rules
Despite an identical basic definition, the results under the TJPG and the AMLA do not always coincide. For domiciliary companies, anti-money laundering law treats as beneficial owners – without any threshold – the persons to whom the assets are attributable; the TJPG, by contrast, applies the 25% threshold uniformly. Adopting AML findings without scrutiny risks over-reporting. The Ordinance expressly exempts such system-related differences from the financial intermediaries’ duty to report discrepancies.44
The EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), applicable from 10.07.2027, also refers to 25% of shares or voting rights, but additionally covers other ownership interests including profit entitlements, allows a risk-based lowering of the threshold and aggregates holdings across several chains. Under Art. 2 TJPV, by contrast, a majority is required at each intermediate level. A person may therefore be a beneficial owner in the EU without being reportable under Swiss law – and vice versa. For groups with an EU nexus, the assessment must be carried out independently under Swiss law.45
The transparency register in M&A and investor agreements
In transactions, contract drafting helps determine who appears in the register. Since control by other means must be assessed in parallel with the 25% threshold, a minority investor may be reportable alongside the majority shareholder; if the investor is a company or a fund, the natural persons behind it must be reported. Vogel/Buschor highlight five points:46
- Draft the veto list deliberately: a veto right automatically constitutes control, regardless of the size of the stake, if it concerns one of five items: change of corporate purpose, appointment of executive management, corporate strategy, budget and investment planning, and equity or debt financing.47 Whether the right has ever been exercised is irrelevant. As the list is exhaustive, there is room for structuring: classic minority protection rights – such as vetoes on mergers, liquidation, relocation of the registered office, transfer restrictions, anti-dilution or related-party transactions – generally do not constitute control. However, quorums tailored to a specific person and purely formal circumventions are captured.
- Blocking a resolution or mere contractual consequence: if a resolution cannot be passed without the holder’s consent (reservation in the articles, voting agreement), there is control. Customary covenants triggering termination or acceleration are not sufficient. Conditional rights – such as a bank’s right to remove the managing director upon a covenant breach – may constitute control once the condition occurs; compliance must be monitored on an ongoing basis.
- Board seats, attendance quorums and earn-outs: anyone able to determine the majority of the supreme managing body controls the company – regardless of the body’s name. Individual nomination rights are not sufficient; nomination rights should therefore remain below a majority. Attendance quorums that prevent resolutions without the appointed representative, and earn-outs with consent rights over strategy, budget or investments, may also confer control.
- Timing between signing and closing: control generally arises only at closing – unlike stock exchange disclosure, which is already triggered by the obligating transaction.48 If the purchase agreement severely restricts management until closing, signing may exceptionally already constitute control by other means. In an acquisition via a NewCo, the chain of control must be traced to the natural persons. While the transitional period is running and the initial report is outstanding, a change need not be reported separately; however, a register change linked to closing shortens the deadline to one month. The purchase agreement should specify who makes which report.49
- Due diligence and purchase agreement: it should be verified whether a report has been made, whether there are obvious defects, whether identification is documented and whether Control Office proceedings are pending; shareholders’ agreements and side letters should also be reviewed for clauses conferring control. The target is generally not liable for reporting breaches by former shareholders, but is liable for its own failure to verify. A warranty as to the accuracy of the register entry and an indemnity for pre-closing breaches are recommended.50
Borderline cases should be reasoned defensibly and documented – anyone proceeding in this way does not, as a rule, act intentionally and is therefore not liable to prosecution. Reporting “too much” as a precaution is not a risk-free shortcut, since an incorrect entry must subsequently be corrected.51
Practical recommendations
For most companies, a lean process is sufficient. What matters is a comprehensive enquiry of all holders, a review of the company’s own documents – a company that overlooks a veto clause in its own articles cannot rely on a shareholder’s declaration – proper documentation and linking the report to existing processes (commercial register changes, general meeting).
| Action | Owner | Effort | Deadline |
| Clarify whether covered and which procedure applies (ordinary or simplified) | Chairman / MD | 0.5–1 h | 31.12.2026 |
| Obtain disclosure declarations from all holders; ask about rights, not contract types | Fiduciary / company secretary | 1–2 h (SME); 1–3 days (complex structures) | Immediately; before next register change |
| Review articles, regulations and minutes for veto clauses and quorums | Company secretary | 0.5–1 h | With previous action |
| Calculate capital and voting ratios separately | Fiduciary | 0.5–1 h | With previous action |
| Document assessment; register and report on EasyGov.swiss | Company secretary | 0.5–1 h | Statutory deadline (section 4) |
| Review shareholders’ and purchase agreements; include warranty and indemnity | Legal counsel | 1–2 h per agreement | Next amendment / transaction |
| Integrate change check (bands, covenants) into AGM process | Fiduciary | 0.25 h p.a. | Annually at AGM |
Conclusion
For the vast majority of Swiss SMEs, the transparency register is a formality that can be completed with little effort – particularly under the simplified procedure. The risks lie in the details: undisclosed nominee arrangements, statutory voting rules, “control by other means”, which must be assessed in parallel and applies even without a significant stake – especially in investor, pooling and succession arrangements – the uncritical adoption of AML or foreign findings, and the one-month deadline triggered by an incidental change to the commercial register entry. For most companies, the transitional periods already end between January and April 2027. Those who analyse their structure now, document their assessment and link the report to the next register change will meet the new obligations with minimal effort.
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- Federal Law on the Transparency of Legal Entities and the Identification of Beneficial Owners (TJPG) of 26.09.2025, Referendum Draft FBl 2025 2900; Ordinance on the Transparency of Legal Entities and the Identification of Beneficial Owners (TJPV); both in force since 01.10.2026 (Federal Council decision of 12.06.2026).
- Introduced via the Federal Act of 12 December 2014 on the Implementation of the 2012 Revised Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which entered into force on 1 July 2015.
- FATF, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures – Switzerland, Mutual Evaluation Report, Paris, December 2016, with particular reference to Recommendation 24 (Transparency of Legal Persons).
- Dispatch on the Federal Act on the Transparency of Legal Persons and the Identification of Beneficial Owners, BBl 2024 1607 (Legislative Item 24.046).
- Luthiger, Reto / von Büren-Maier, Nadine / Rebell, Christian / Müller, Andrea, “Introduction of a Central Transparency Register in Switzerland for Recording Beneficial Owners of Companies and Other Legal Entities,” MLL News, 24 October 2025, mll-news.com (cited as: Luthiger et al.).
- Federal Office of Justice (FOJ), Swiss Transparency Register, Chronology, bj.admin.ch (accessed 21 October 2026); law.ch, “Money Laundering: Federal Council Enacts Stricter Rules and a New Transparency Register,” 17 June 2026.
- FOJ (fn. 6); Ordinance of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) on the Pilot Project for the Transparency Register, in force since 18 May 2026.
- Vogel Alexander/Buschor Dario, “Hardly Any Shares – Yet Still in the Transparency Register: Control in a Different Form Under the New TJPG,” MLL News, 2026, mll-news.com. (cited as: Vogel/Buschor, Control)
- Art. 1 et seq. TJPG; Commercial Register Office of the Canton of Schwyz, Fact Sheet on the Swiss Transparency Register, 2026.
- Art. 3 TJPG.
- Art. 15 et seq. TJPG; retention period of five years following the end of the function (Art. 16 para. 7 TJPG).
- Art. 4 para. 1 TJPG; the definition is identical in wording to Art. 2a para. 3 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA/GwG).
- MLL News, “Control through Direct Participation under Art. 1 TJPV,” series of articles on the new Transparency Act, 2026, mll-news.com.
- Art. 15 para. 1 lit. b TJPV; cf. also Art. 3 para. 2 lit. e TJPV (trusts as a means of control by other means); MLL News (fn. 13).
- Art. 7 para. 2 TJPG; Art. 690 para. 2 CO (Swiss Code of Obligations).
- Art. 693 CO.
- Art. 3 para. 2 lit. b TJPV; MLL News (fn. 13).
- Arts. 685a, 685c, and 686 CO; regarding the implications for transactions, cf. section 10.
- Art. 2 TJPV; MLL News (fn. 13); regarding the consultation draft, see Luthiger et al. (fn. 5).
- Vogel/Buschor, Control (fn. 8).
- Art. 3 para. 2 TJPV; Vogel/Buschor, Control (fn. 8), with further practical examples.
- Art. 4 and Art. 13 para. 2 TJPV; Vogel/Buschor, Kontrolle (fn. 8); Wenger Vieli AG, Spotlight: Das neue Transparenzregister [Spotlight: The New Transparency Register], 2025, section 2.
- Vogel/Buschor, Kontrolle (fn. 8); MLL News (fn. 13), “No cascade.”
- Art. 4 para. 2 TJPG; Art. 20 para. 3 TJPV.
- Art. 21 TJPV.
- Art. 9 TJPG; Art. 10 TJPV.
- Art. 12 TJPV.
- Art. 13 para. 1 and Art. 39 para. 3 TJPV; Vogel/Buschor, Kontrolle (fn. 8); Luthiger et al. (fn. 5).
- Art. 8 TJPG.
- Fact sheet of the Commercial Register Office (HRA) of Schwyz (fn. 9); Federal Office of Justice (BJ), transpareg.admin.ch; Luthiger et al. (fn. 5).
- Art. 12 TJPG.
- Art. 51 para. 1 TJPG; Vogel/Buschor, Kontrolle (fn. 8), “The time limits are already running.”
- Art. 11 TJPG; Arts. 35 et seq. TJPV; regarding implementation by the commercial register offices, cf. Government Council of the Canton of Aargau, statement dated 14 January 2026 concerning the consultation process for the TJPV.
- Art. 13 paras. 3 and 4 TJPG.
- Art. 14 TJPG.
- Vogel/Buschor, Kontrolle (fn. 8).
- Arts. 25–28 TJPG; Luthiger et al. (fn. 5).
- Art. 29 para. 2 TJPG.
- Wenger Vieli (fn. 22), section 7.
- law.ch (fn. 6); Wenger Vieli (fn. 22), section 6. Advisors are exempt from this reporting obligation; regarding the exceptions, see section 9.
- Arts. 35–39 TJPG; Luthiger et al. (fn. 5).
- Art. 45 TJPG in conjunction with the VStrR (SR 313.0).
- Annex, section 2, TJPG (amendment of other enactments); Art. 50 TJPG.
- Art. 56 letter a TJPV; MLL News (fn. 13).
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (AMLR); MLL News (fn. 13), “A Look at the EU.”
- Vogel, Alexander / Buschor, Dario, Transparency Registers in Deals: Five Points for M&A and Investor Agreements, MLL News, 2026, mll-news.com. (cited as: Vogel/Buschor, Deal)
- Art. 3 para. 1 letter b TJPV; Vogel/Buschor, Deal (fn. 46), section 1.
- Art. 120 FinfraG in conjunction with Art. 13 para. 1 FinfraV-FINMA; MLL News (fn. 13).
- Vogel/Buschor, Deal (fn. 46), section 4; cf. Art. 13 and 51 para. 1 TJPG.
- Vogel/Buschor, Deal (fn. 46), para. 5.
- Vogel/Buschor, Deal (fn. 46), conclusion.